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In this paper we study wage differentials  between young male and female workers.  
Only a few previous studies deal with the analysis of the wage gap among young 
people. In Wood et al. (1993), the gender wage gap between graduates of the University of 
Michigan Law School classes of 1972-1975 was estimated to be equal to 40 percent of the 
male wage 15 years from entering the labour market. This result was partly due to different 
choices in the hours of work and in worker qualifications by gender; but even controlling 
for these factors, women were found to earn 20 percent less than men. Several other 
studies on young workers estimate lower levels of wage differentials; however, many of 
these studies were not able to control for actual experience because of lack of information 
and results are therefore biased. Loprest (1992), using a sample of 18-25 year old women 
and men drawn from the U.S. National Labour Survey, estimated an entry wage gap of 11 
percentage points. Dolton and Makepeace (1987) found a 7 percent wage gap for a sample 
of U.K. graduates in 1970. The research on the gender pay gap in the U.S. generally 
explains the wage differential in terms of a lower female level of effective work 
experience compared to men and relatively higher returns to work experience for men. 
Even job changes appear to favour men compared to women in the first years of their 
careers [Loprest (1992), Polachek and Robst (2001)]. Kunze (2002), employing an 
administrative dataset for Germany, shows that the wage gap among young skilled full-
time workers was around 23% across the early years of a career. 
The analysis of discrimination generally adopts the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
methodology. Although recent extensions of this approach
1 control for some distributional 
aspects, the methodology is fundamentally based on the analysis of the ‘average’ level of 
discrimination. Following Jenkins (1994) we propose analysing wage differentials using 
the complete distribution of earnings estimated at the individual level. The distributional 
approach makes it possible to disentangle discrimination into its group component and its 
individual dimension due to differences in the characteristics that employers observe as a 
measure of productivity when setting wages.  
Our analysis is based on a sample of 15 to 29 year olds working in two provinces – 
Treviso and Vicenza – of the Veneto region (North-Eastern Italy). Focusing on young 
workers is particularly interesting since it allows us to test whether there is any emerging 
discrimination even during the early years of a person’s career, when there is only a little 
difference of experience between the sexes. The analysis is of particular interest in the case 
of our sample age group since female participation and employment rates among these 
younger workers are particularly high and the educational level of women is similar to that 
of their male counterparts. So entry level wages or wages in the early years of one’s career 
should only be expected to show differentials if employers have information on people’s 
productivity which is unmeasured in the data set or if they discriminate against women or 
other groups.  
We evaluate the gender wage gap on the universe of 15-29 year old female and male 
private workers drawn from the administrative data set of the National Social Security 
                                                           
1 This methodology has been extended in two different directions. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) have 
extended the Oaxaca decomposition by taking into account the residual distribution, useful when analysing 
the gender gap in a comparative setting or throughout a long temporal interval. Brown, Moon and Zoloth 
(1980) have extended the approach to endogenize the distribution of women across occupations.   3
System for the two provinces in two different years (1990 and 1997). The full data set 
contains the universe of workers employed in the private sector for the period 1976-1997. 
The availability of a time-series and the structure of the data give us precise information on 
work experience, firm-specific human capital (tenure in the actual firm) and make it 
possible to control for individual and occupational characteristics, economic sectors and 
local labour markets. 
Our dataset allows the match of information on individual characteristics to information 
on the size and economic sector of firms. Then we are able to estimate earnings functions 
where we control for different human capital characteristics as the general experience 
accumulated in the labour marker and the specific experience acquired with the present 
employer; in addition we construct a proxy for the individual’s educational level and we 
instrument that variable with a measure of the supply-side of the educational system. We 
also control for a firm’s local labour market location.  
In Section 2 we present the methodological approach based on the distributional 
analysis. In Section 3 we describe the dataset and some descriptive statistics. Earnings 
function estimates by gender are discussed in Section 4, while in Section 5 the 
distributional analysis of the unexplained wage gap is then illustrated and implemented. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Oaxaca-Blinder approach: remarks and suggestions  
 
The empirical research on discrimination widely adopts the approach of Oaxaca-Blinder 
(1973)
2. Gender discrimination is defined as the difference between the average wage 
women earn and the average wage they would earn if they were men, given the same 
characteristics. The methodology consists in estimating gender-separate ‘earnings 
functions’ explaining worker income as a function of individual and occupational 
characteristics. Then, the total estimated difference is decomposed into two terms: a first 
term representing productivity differences explained by individual characteristics and a 
second term explaining any earnings gaps in terms of differences in the remuneration of 
the characteristics. This second term represents the discriminatory component of the wage 
gap. Traditionally, the methodology then suggests the calculation of an index of 
discrimination defined as the average of the difference between the average reference 
wage – e.g. the wage that women would be estimated to earn if their characteristics were 
paid as much as men’s – and the average estimated female earnings. 
Although the aim of the Oaxaca-Blinder’s analysis is to estimate the extent of 
discrimination throughout the distribution of individuals’ characteristics, the evaluation of 
the wage differential is actually made in average terms. Therefore, the estimate of 
discrimination is effectively reduced to the average and the analysis is simplified to an 
analysis of group discrimination. The comparison of average wages between minority and 
majority groups makes the model equivalent to exact or non-stochastic models.  
The neoclassical theories of discrimination can help us to understand the meaning of the 
empirical analysis of discrimination better. The theoretical approaches suggest 
distinguishing between group (or deterministic) discrimination and individual (or 
stochastic) discrimination (Cain, 1986). In both cases, discrimination may arise even 
                                                           
2 For a presentation of the analysis of discrimination, we suggest the surveys of Antonji and Blank (1999) 
and Kunze (2002).  4
though workers are equally productive and have equal tastes for work. Group 
discrimination affects all workers belonging to the minority group equally. In contrast 
stochastic (or individual) discrimination allows for individual deviations within the 
particular group. The models of individual discrimination assume that employers do not 
have perfect information and do not know the true productivity of each worker; they set 
wages relying on the characteristics they observe, which although related to productivity 
do not perfectly represent productivity. The stochastic model does not predict group 
discrimination if employers set wages equal to the expected value of productivity and 
individuals are equally productive (or have equal productive capacity). Individual 
discrimination can arise either because of the different reliability of the indicator that 
employers observe for the two groups or because men have a higher probability of market 
work compared with women (Thurow 1975).  
The deterministic and stochastic models have always been considered as 
complementary as they do not predict the same type of discrimination. Actually, the 
stochastic model can be generalised supposing that employers’ behaviour on average, 
discriminates against the minority group; this can happen if employers, although setting 
wages on the base of the expected productivity, discriminate against the minority group by 
setting wages equal to the expected productivity less a discriminatory amount. This 
generalisation allows stochastic models to predict both group discrimination – when the 
wage difference is evenly distributed across all levels of the observed characteristics – and 
individual discrimination, because of a different distribution of the characteristics within 
the different groups. Summing up the two components of the wage differential, we can 
observe whether individuals from the minority group are discriminated against equally or 
whether, depending on the distribution of the individual characteristics, the market 
differently discriminates between workers within the minority group.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder methodology substantially limits the explanatory power of the 
regression analysis, which potentially allows us to identify the existence of individual 
discrimination along the distribution of the characteristics that employers use as indicators 
to set the level of wages. The first critical remarks relating to this approach go back to 
Dolton and Makepeace (1985) and Munroe (1988) who identified the shortcomings of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder methodology and the need to use the entire set of information contained in 
the distribution of earnings. Building on these contributions, Jenkins (1994) developed a 
method for analysing discrimination that made use of the complete information contained 
in the distributions of estimated and reference female earnings. Briefly, the method he 
proposed entails a comparison of the relative position of the Generalised Lorenz Curve 
(GLC) with respect to the Generalised Concentrations Curve (GCC)
3, suggesting that 
discrimination exists whenever the GCC lies above the GLC.  
However, while supporting the call for ‘tractable methods of presenting information 
about the complete distribution of discrimination experience’ (Jenkins, 1994), we believe 
that the method developed by Jenkins falls short from being an adequate answer. The 
                                                           
3 In order to construct the GLC, after ordering female workers by ascending observed wage, one plots the 
cumulative estimated wage per capita ∑ =
k
i w i n y
1 ˆ , against the cumulative sample share  w n k p ≡ , for each 
k = 1, …, nw ( nw is the total number of femal workers). Similarly, to summarise the no-discrimnation 
distribution using a GCC, one plots the cumulative reference wage per capita ∑ =
k
i w i n r
1 ˆ  against p, for each 
k = 1, …, nw, ensuring women are ordered exactly as for the GLC. 
  5
fundamental problem in Jenkins’ method is that a GCC above the GLC does not 
necessarily imply discrimination against women along the whole distribution: by 
construction, the distance between the GCC and the GLC depends on cumulated 
differences between estimated and reference earnings, so that it can be positive even 
though the marginal contribution of one more female worker is negative. 
Based on these considerations, we propose an alternative method that evaluates 
discrimination by focussing directly on the distributions of estimated and reference 
earnings, resorting to the estimate of stochastic kernels to describe their relationship; this 
method makes it possible to detect both group and individual components of the 
unexplained wage gap, and to assign a probability of occurrence to any level of 
discrimination at any point in the distribution with respect to a given characteristic.  
There is a clear analogy to be made between the alternative approach we propose and 
the distributional approach to the analysis of cross-sectional economic convergence 
developed by Quah (1996, 1997). Within the convergence literature, the evolution over 
time of the cross-sectional distribution of per capita income is viewed as a stochastic 
process whose law of motion is studied by resorting to a stochastic kernel
4. However, the 
definition of a stochastic kernel does not require the distributions under study to relate 
exclusively to per capita income nor, as Quah (1997) makes clear, to be sequential in time 
and can thus be used to relate any two distributions. 
The approach can be summarised as follows. First, as in the traditional analysis, we 
estimate log wage equations for men and women as a function of their characteristics – m X  
for men and  f X  for women – and an error term: 
 
i m m m ε β X ) (W log
i i + =  (1) 
 
i f f f ε β X ) (W log
i i + =  (2) 
 




i i b X y =  (3) 
 
and the series of reference earnings, defined as the wages women would receive were they 




i i b X r =  (4) 
 
for each individual i within the set of female workers F. 
 
It is at this stage that our approach departs from the traditional one. The latter would 
evaluate discrimination as the average of the difference between estimated and reference 
                                                           
4 Other examples of the use of stochastic processes in economics include stochastic growth models (see e.g. 
Stokey and Lucas (with Prescott), 1989) and models of income distribution dynamics (see e.g. Loury (1981) 
who use a stochastic process to model the dynamics of the earnings distribution among successive 
generations of workers.  6
earnings, expressed in log transformation:  ) ( f m f b b X − . In contrast, to evaluate the 
incidence of discrimination we focus directly on the relationship between the cross-
individual distributions of reference and estimated earnings. For this purpose, let R and Y 
denote respectively the distributions of reference and estimated earnings across female 
workers. Associated with these distributions there are two probability measures: 
ρ corresponds to the distribution of reference earnings and υ to the distribution of 
estimated earnings. Next, we introduce a relationship between the two distributions. The 
simplest way of modelling this relationship is the following: 
 
 ) ( ) , ( υ υ ρ
∗ ∗ = = u T u T  (5) 
 
where u is a sequence of disturbances, T
* an operator that maps the Cartesian product of 
the probability measure υ and the disturbances, and 
∗
u T  absorbs the disturbance into the 
definition of the operator and encodes information on the relationship between the two 




Notice that when the earnings space is discrete, i.e. the earnings are grouped into a set 
of non-overlapping classes, the measures ρ and υ can be represented by probability vectors 
and the operator in equation (5) simplifies into a probability matrix, P, whose rows and 
columns are indexed by the element of the discretisation, and whose generic element pij 
reports the probability of finding reference earnings that belong to class j, given that 
estimated earnings are in class i. More generally, when the continuous set of earnings 
values is retained, the operator 
∗
u T  can be interpreted as a stochastic kernel, giving the 
probability density function (PDF) of  r R ˆ =  conditional on  y Y ˆ = , i.e.  ) y ˆ   |   r ˆ (   f . 
From an operational point of view, the procedure to produce an estimate of the 
conditional distribution  ) y ˆ   |   r ˆ (   f  can be described as follows. First, we estimate non-
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where di = ( i i y ˆ , r ˆ ) is the i-th observation, d = ( y ˆ , r ˆ ) is a fixed point, K(.) is the kernel 
function, while  r hˆ and  y hˆ  are the bandwidths
6. Next, we estimate the marginal distribution 
) y ˆ f (   using a univariate kernel
7. Finally, we obtain the estimate of  ) y ˆ   |   r ˆ (   f , the 
                                                           
5 For a rigorous presentation of the underlying mathematics see Durlauf and Quah (1999) and references 
given there. 
6 To estimate the joint distribution, we have used a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally 
according to Silverman (1986). 
7 As in the bivariate case, we have used a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth chosen optimally (Silverman 
1986). Note that Quah (1996) suggests estimating the marginal distribution by numerically integrating the 
joint distribution with respect to reference earnings. However, the asymptotic statistical properties of both 
estimators are identical and produce very similar results in practice (Overman and Ioannides, 2001).  7
distribution of reference earnings conditional on estimated earnings, by dividing the joint 





r , y f
y | r f
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ =           ( 8 )  
 
The incidence and direction of discrimination can thus be studied by analysing directly 
the shape of the three-dimensional plot of the stochastic kernel and of the corresponding 
two-dimensional contour plot. In particular, a probability mass stretching along the 45 
degree line would imply the absence of discrimination as, for any level of estimated 
earnings, reference earnings would tend to assume the same value. In contrast, a 
probability mass lying consistently above the 45 degree line would indicate that, for any 
level of estimated earnings, reference earnings tended to exceed their estimated 
counterparts, thereby suggesting the existence of discrimination against female workers. 
Analogously, discrimination in favour of female workers would be signalled by a 
concentration of the probability mass below the 45 degree line, as reference earnings 
tended to be smaller than the corresponding levels of estimated earnings.  
Finally, stochastic kernels can also be used in order to investigate the role of specific 
factors or worker’s characteristics in shaping the distribution of discrimination. The actual 
way in which this can be accomplished depends on the nature of the characteristics. In 
general, these characteristics fall into two categories. They can be measured on a 
continuous space, as in the cases of the experience accumulated within the firm and of the 
general experience accumulated during the individual’s working history or they can be 
represented as categorical or dummy variables, like the level of education. In the former 
case, we can exploit the fact that a stochastic kernel can be used to relate any two 
distributions, and study directly the relationship between the distribution of discrimination 
and the distribution of any characteristic. To do this we first calculate the level of 
discrimination for each female worker as the difference between reference and estimated 
earnings. Then, we denote the distribution of discrimination with D and the associated 
probability measure with δ. Similarly, we denote the distribution of the characteristic with 
C and its probability measure with γ. Similarly to what we did before, we model the 
relationship between the two distributions as 
 
  ) ( T ) , ( T ε ε γ δ ε




ε T  is the stochastic kernel, giving the distribution of discrimination conditional on 
the distribution of the characteristic. Operationally, this can be estimated according to the 
same procedure described above. As for the interpretation of the results, the only 
difference is that now the absence of discrimination is represented by a concentration of 
the probability mass along the line running parallel to the characteristic’s axis and in 
correspondence to a level of discrimination equal to zero. 
Where the characteristics are measured by categorical or dummy variables, the 
conditional density function cannot be estimated as in equation (8). Suppose that the 
                                                           
8 Under regularity conditions this represents a consistent estimator for the conditional distribution 
[Rosenblatt (1971), Silverman (1986), Quah (1996), Chen, Linton and Robinson (2001)].  8
characteristic of interest presents l levels and that the set of all individuals can thus be 
divided into l separate subsets. Denote with Gn the subset of individuals having a level n 
for the characteristic (with n = 1, …, l), and with  { } n i G G i r ˆ r ˆ
n ∈ = :  and  {} n i G G i y ˆ y ˆ
n ∈ = : 
the observations on reference and estimated earnings corresponding to individuals in Gn. 
Then, modelling the relationship between reference and estimated earnings as in equation 
(5), we can estimate l different stochastic kernels. Each of these stochastic kernels shows 
the distribution of reference earnings conditional on the distribution of estimated earnings, 
for a given level of the characteristic.  Moreover, direct comparisons between the estimates 
of the kernels for different levels of the characteristic indicate how the distribution of 
reference and estimated earnings is affected by changes in the level of the characteristic.  
 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
 
We use administrative data made available from the National Social Security System 
(Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS) for the two North-Eastern Italian 
provinces of Treviso and Vicenza. The INPS database is composed of different archives 
containing information on the universe of workers who had at least one employment spell 
eligible for the social security insurance scheme in any year between 1976 and 1997
9 and 
on the universe of firms which paid any social security contribution during the same 
period.  
The database makes it possible to match each worker to each different firm he or she 
used to work from the beginning of their working experience; this means we can merge 
personal data with information on gross earnings
10, type of job, sector and firm-size for 
each spell of employment. Since the dataset contains information on the exact number of 
weeks spent working every year with any particular employer, we are able to determine 
precisely both the effective general experience and the firm specific experience 
accumulated respectively in the labour market and in the firm, net of periods of absence 
from the labour market. This allows us to estimate separately the effect of the different 
components of human capital on the level of wages. We therefore define two different 
variables. The variable “tenure” summarises the accumulation of specific human capital 
with the current employer and is defined as the total number of weeks spent in the firm 
employing the worker at the time we observe his or her wage; the variable “experience” 
captures the dimension of the accumulated generic human capital and is expressed as the 
total number of weeks worked in the labour market since the beginning of the worker’s 
working experience. So it includes work experience with previous employers other than 
the present firm. If our sample were made of all workers, measurement errors could arise 
in evaluating individual experience due to the left-censored nature of the dataset. However, 
since we are focusing on young workers aged 15-29 in 1990, the data available to us make 
it possible to calculate both the total period of working experience and the total length of 
experience in the firm so long as the individual was working at the time we observe the 
wage. The availability of this data is a particularly interesting and worth feature of our 
analysis. In contrast to most studies on the subject that rely on household surveys, we can 
                                                           
9 For detailed information about the INPS archives (for the provinces of Treviso and Vicenza) see  Occari et 
al. (1996). 
10 Gross earnings include social security contributions. We use the ISTAT Consumer Price Index 
(base=1995) to deflate earnings.  9
avoid making use of potential experience as a proxy for actual experience and to exactly 
determine tenure. 
One of the drawbacks of this dataset is the lack of information on worker educational 
levels. To overcome this problem, we construct a proxy for the highest completed level of 
education using the age at which an individual first started work, identified by the first 
non-seasonal spell of work. What we mean by first non-seasonal spell is the first 
inscription in the INPS archive either for a period not shorter than 17 weeks or for a period 
between 4 and 17 weeks but not between May and September of any year (as it could 
otherwise be interpreted as a working spell compatible with school attendance). Having 
identified the age at which an individual first entered the labour market on a career basis 
we derive the educational level along the following criteria: we assign an upper-secondary 
educational level to individuals who entered the INPS archive between 19 and 24 years 
old. We assign a tertiary educational level – university education – if workers entered the 
dataset when older than 24 years
11. We assign a level of education lower than upper-
secondary if workers entered the INPS archives when younger than 19 years. The variable 
education we employ in the estimates is a categorical variable assuming a value of 1 when 
the educational level is lower than upper-secondary (or compulsory diploma
12), a value of 
2 if the estimated education level is equal to upper-secondary and a value of 3 for the 
university level
13.  
We generate two samples of young workers for the years 1990 and 1997. We focus the 
analysis on individuals working the whole year in order to have a homogeneous sample 
and to exclude seasonal working spells; moreover we exclude managers because of female 
under-representation in those types of occupations. The analysis is carried out for workers 
in the manufacturing, commerce and credit-insurance sectors
14. Foreigners are excluded 
from the sample because we are not able to instrument for education. Finally, following 
the debate on the risks involved using INPS data for the analysis of wage gaps, we include 
in our sample only workers with a number of days worked equal or higher than 280
15. The 
final sample is then made of 71057 workers in 1990 and 64760 workers in 1997
16. The 
INPS archives provide information on yearly gross earnings (gross of social contributions 
and income taxes) and the number of days worker per worker-spell. We therefore derive 
our dependent variable – daily earnings – dividing the yearly earnings by worked days in 
each year (thousands of  lira at constant prices 1995). 
Some interesting facts emerge from looking at the sample composition (Table A1). 
With respect to the educational level, most workers, independently of sex, have an 
educational level lower than upper-secondary, in both years. The difference between sexes 
is rather small, with 69% of women and 71% of men in 1990 (52% of women and 59% of 
men in 1997) having an educational level lower than upper-secondary education. However, 
the gender difference increased during the first years of the 1990s and in 1997 there were 
                                                           
11 During the 1990s most of the Italian university curricula were lasting for 4 or 5 years. Therefore we 
summed a 5 year period to the age of the upper-secondary diploma. 
12 For the period to which the data relate the Italian leaving school age was set at 14. 
13 Because of the way it is constructed, the educational variable could present problems of measurement 
error. Therefore, we instrumented the variable, as discussed in the following paragraph. 
14 The economic sectors considered in the analysis are those included in the 3, 4, 6 and 8 one-digit ATECO 
1981 ISTAT classification. 
15 INPS data on wages seem to be overestimated for people working only a few days in a year. For that 
reason. For the debate, see Ginzburg et al. (1998, 1999), Gavosto and Rossi (1999).  
16 The percentage of women is 47.6% in 1990 and 47% in 1997.  10
proportionately more men with less than an upper-secondary education. The proportion of 
women with at least an upper-secondary educational level sharply increased, in 
particularly with respect to the secondary level. It increased from 29% to 45%. The 
positive trend was less evident for men - increasing from a 27% to a 36%. The gender 
educational gap at the highest level also fell, although the difference in 1997 still amounted 
to 1.7 percentage points (2.7% for women against 4.4% for men). The variable “education” 
summarises the three different levels discussed above. In average terms, the educational 
level of women appears to be higher than the educational level of men, in both years, and 
to have risen during the first half of the 1990s. 
Looking at other human capital characteristics rather small gender differences appear. 
Gender is particularly relevant in determining the type of experience that workers 
accumulate; women tend to accumulate more specific human capital than men with men 
tending to invest more in general experience. The average tenure accumulated is slightly 
higher for female workers than for men and the difference increased during the period. In 
contrast, men have on average a longer period of experience but the gap was reduced over 
the period.  
Summarising the information about the human capital characteristics of our samples, 
we see that there are only small differences between the sexes. The most significant 
differences are in terms of occupational and sector concentration. Women are mainly 
concentrated in white-collar occupations, especially in 1997, in the textile sector and in 
firms of small to medium size. Men are more numerous in the metal and precision tools 
sector and in larger firms. Both groups have similar proportions of full-time workers, 
although the proportion of females who worked full-time fell slightly over the period. The 
proportion of Contratti di Formazione Lavoro (CFL; Working and training contracts)
17 
and Apprenticeship contracts decreased for both groups; the former were dismissed late in 
the 1990s while the latter were substituted by the introduction of other types of contracts. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis  
 
Before discussing the econometric analysis, we can look briefly at the male and female 
distributions of earnings (Table A2). Recent Italian studies [ITER (2001), Flabbi (2001)] 
have shown different earnings trends depending on the data used. Data from the Ministry 
of Finance show an increase in the wage gap from 29% in 1982 to 36% in 1996; data from 
the same source, but for the sub-sample of year-round
18 employees, show a smaller wage 
difference, however steadily increasing from 19% in 1982 to 21% in 1994. Data from the 
Bank of Italy for the whole distribution of earnings show an increase in the wage gap 
between men and women during the first years of the 90s with a much stronger worsening 
for manual female workers than for white-collar worker. Conversely, considering only 
year-round employees, data from the Bank of Italy show an increasing female relative 
wage. Table A2 reports a much smaller gender wage gap than those estimated using data 
from the Bank of Italy or from the Ministry of Finance. A comparison over time shows an 
increase in the wage difference along the entire distribution, except for the last quartile. 
Young females with high earnings experience lower wage gaps than their low wage 
                                                           
17 The CFL were introduced in 1985 in order to improve the youth chance (aged less than 30) to get a job. 
The employer is provided with a rebate on the labour cost and a full exemption from firing costs. 
18 That means that they worked in the same job all year.  11
colleagues. However, once more, there exist sharp differences conditional on the type of 
occupation: the gender wage gap decreases along the whole distribution of white-collar 
workers, while it increased at all wage levels  in the blue-collar distribution. 
Our econometric analysis presents some methodological problems that have been 
widely discussed in the literature. One of the issues on which most of this discussion has 
focused is related to the reliability of the estimates of the female earnings function. Labour 
force participation and unemployment rates differ substantially between men and women 
and are generally lower for women than for men. As a result the coefficient estimates in 
the female wage equations could be biased because of a non-random selection of women 
who work. In particular, the returns to education could be overestimated. This empirical 
problem can be consistently solved by a two stage procedure where in the first stage a 
participation equation is estimated while in the second stage the earnings function is 
corrected by the inverse of the Mill’s ratio derived from the first stage participation 
equation (Heckman, 1979). In order to identify the participation equation, however, 
specific variables have to be used; usually, the variables of interest are those related to 
marriage and maternity choices as well as to the household background; household 
characteristics as well as educational and occupational characteristics of each individual’s 
parents are usually recognised as good variables in order to identify the participation 
choice. 
Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain any information on the individual’s 
background so we are not able to correct our estimates for selection into participation. 
However, the logic underlying the correction for participation is that female activity and 
employment rates substantially differ from those of males . This, however, is not the case 
in our analysis. Actually, stylised facts about the region our provinces belong to –Veneto - 
show rather similar activity rates between men and women, especially for people aged 
between 18 and 29. The activity rate of this group in Veneto in 2000 was 67% against 56% 
in Italy as a whole; the female activity rate was 65% against a male activity rate of 70% 
(respectively 50% and 62% in Italy)
19. This suggests a substantive homogeneity of labour 
market participation with respect to the two sexes, at least in terms of this younger age 
group.  
It is also relevant to bear in mind the extent to which the age motherhood has risen in 
recent decades. In the Veneto the average age of women at marriage and at the birth of 
their first child is higher than it is nationally; in 2000 the average age at first childbirth in 
the Veneto region was 30 years and 6 months. These facts suggest that the choice between 
maternity and participation does not fundamentally affect most women in the age group we 
are studying. Both considerations let us conclude that selection bias between the sexes in 
participationdoes not represent a real problem that could significantly influence our results. 
A second econometric problem when applying the OLS methodology to the estimation 
of earnings functions arises because of the likely inconsistency of the estimate of education 
(Card, 2001)
20. OLS estimates of returns to education can be inconsistent principally 
because of endogeneity problems; the educational variable can be correlated with some 
unobservable characteristics – such as ability or motivation – that are included in the error 
                                                           
19 These data are taken from the Regione Veneto (2002), Primo Rapporto sulla Condizione Giovanile nel 
Veneto. 
20 For a selected review of Italian studies that estimate the returns to education see Brunello and Miniaci 
(1999). A more detailed but older survey is in Lucifora and Sestito (1994). Recent estimates of returns to 
education in Italy are in Brunello, Comi and Lucifora (2000).  12
term. It follows that OLS estimates are inconsistent because of the correlation of the 
schooling variable with the stochastic term of the earnings function. Inconsistency of OLS 
estimates can arise also because of measurement errors. In our case, this problem could be 
particularly relevant because of the way we have constructed our variable; our proxy for 
education could systematically overestimate the educational level of lower ability workers 
who may enter the labour market later and underestimate the educational level of more 
able workers. The use of instrumental variables is the standard solution to a problem such 
as this. The most recent studies on the relation between education and earnings follow the 
basic idea that institutional features of the education system can be used as credible 
instrumental variables for individual schooling outcomes. Supply-side sources of variation 
in schooling are used to help resolve identification problems on the demand side of the 
education market (Card, 2001). Sources of variation in the supply of schooling are usually 
represented by the minimum school-leaving age, by tuition costs or by the geographic 
proximity of schools.  
In our study, however, we could not use a measure of schooling supply such as the 
minimum school-leaving age and tuition costs. The minimum school-leaving age is not a 
good instrument to capture the variability of the educational level because we are 
analysing workers subject to the same institutional constraints; tuition costs are not a good 
instrument because the Italian educational system, especially in the years covered by our 
data, was mainly dominated by a public sector which precluded differences in tuition fees. 
The relevant variable we chose to instrument the educational level is the geographical 
availability of schools. For each Comune (municipality) in the ‘place of birth’ field of the 
dataset, we calculated the number of upper-secondary institutes within the Comune itself 
and within the Comuni within a radius of 15 kilometres from the Comune’s centroid
21. 
Regression results are reported in Table A3
22. Our dependent variable is the natural log 
of daily earnings. In addition to the human capital variables we described above, we 
included other controls capturing the impact of the type of occupation (white-collar/blue-
collar), the type of contract (full-time/part-time, apprenticeship and training contracts -
CFL), economic sector
23 and firm-size
24. We also included dummies for each local labour 
market system. 
Estimates confirm the positive effect of any human capital characteristic on the level of 
daily wages, independently of sex. However, the returns to human capital significantly 
decreased over the period, especially for female workers. The estimates of the returns to 
education confirm the results of previous empirical analyses on Italian data; women 
receive higher returns to education than men (Brunello, Comi and Lucifora, 2000). This in 
both years, although in 1997 the returns are in general much lower than in 1990. 
Educational levels higher than lower secondary education were estimated to produce a 14 
to 23 percent higher wage in 1990 and between 9% and 12% higher in 1997. In annual 
                                                           
21 The source of the data on secondary institutes is the Ministry of Education, University and Research. 
Geographical availability has been worked out using ArcView GIS.  
22 We do not show the local labour market dummies (LLM); however we can provide the complete tables on 
request. The significant LLM dummies are different between the two genders and the estimated coefficient is 
often negative.  
23 We use the  ISTAT definition (ATECO 1981). 
24 We also estimated a model specification with fixed effects at the firm level. The coefficient estimates in 
this case did not differ from the coefficients we present in this section, confirming the robustness of our 
specification. We preferred to drop fixed effects at the firm level because it allows us to separate firm-size 
effects from sector and local labour market effects.  13
terms, each year of school at upper-secondary level yielded a 3 to 5.5 percent higher wage 
in 1990 and between 2 and 3 percent higher in 1997. Any year of university study 
generated a 2 to 6 percent higher wage depending on the year and on the gender. Our 
estimates are in general lower than other estimates for Italy. This can be explained by the 
average age of the sample and because we are able to control for the real working 
experience of our workers.  
General and specific experience affects the wage profiles of the two groups differently. 
While women get a higher premium than men the longer they stay in a firm, men receive a 
greater return compared to females if they accumulate general experience. However, the 
higher return to female specific human capital fell over the period.  
White-collar workers receive a premium with respect to blue-collars which is different 
in the two years and for the two genders. The white-collar occupational premium for 
women was lower than the male in 1990 but higher in 1997. Particularly interesting are the 
estimates of the dummies for workers with apprenticeship contracts and CFL; wages for 
these workers are sharply lower than for the others, but women are less disadvantaged by 
this feature of the wage function and experience a lower gap.  
Firm-size dummies show gains for both sexes when working in medium and large 
firms. Men lost a maximum of 6.5 percent in 1990 and 7.6 percent in 1997 when working 
in firms with less than 20 employers and gained up to about 6 percent in both years if 
employed in large firms. Women employed in large firms gain 8.7 percent in 1990 and 10 
percent in 1997, while they lost up to a maximum of about 3.4 percent in 1990 and 5 
percent in 1997 when employed in a small firm. 
 
 
5. The unexplained wage gap: the distributional analysis 
 
The first step in our distributional approach to the analysis of wage discrimination is 
represented by the estimate of the density function of the counterfactual earnings 
conditional on the estimated values; i.e. the density function  ( ) y | r f ˆ ˆ ˆ  of equation (8). 
Indeed, a contour plot of this density function allows us not only to understand whether 
there is discrimination but also to evaluate the relationship between the extent of 
discrimination and the level of the estimated wage. In particular, the 45-degree diagonal in 
the contour plot highlights the absence of wage discrimination; if most of the density mass 
was concentrated along this diagonal, then estimated and reference wages for female 
workers would coincide. In contrast, a concentration of the probability mass away from the 
45-degree diagonal and closer to the reference wage axis would indicate that substantial 
wage discrimination against female workers exists.  
Figure 1 shows the contour plots of the Gaussian kernel density functions of the 
counterfactual earnings conditional on the estimated values. We represent the estimated 
level of wages on the horizontal axes and the counterfactual values on the vertical one; if 
the density function is concentrated above the diagonal, that indicates discrimination 
against women; otherwise we have discrimination against men.  
Three main features seem to emerge. First, the projection of the density function 
presents a clear upwards shift at a level of about 50 thousands lire in both years. Through a 
more detailed analysis of the data, it was easy to identify the workers with a level of 
earnings lower or equal to that threshold; they are the part-time workers. Part-time workers 
are characterised by both positive and negative discrimination while full-time workers  14
mainly experience negative discrimination. The second observation concerns the level of 
the unexplained wage gap; looking at individuals with a wage higher than 50 (focusing 
therefore on full-time workers), we find clear evidence that being discriminated against for 
women became almost a certain state of the world over the period; in 1997 the conditional 
density function for full time workers was concentrated almost entirely above the 45-
degree diagonal. However, there does not appear to be individual discrimination; the level 
of the unexplained wage gap is evenly distributed across the levels of wages. The range of 
the unexplained wage gap does not change along the distribution of the estimated earnings. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
In the theoretical section we pointed out the interesting issue of distinguishing between 
group and individual discrimination. Our methodology makes it possible to investigate this 
directly by looking at the distribution of the conditional density function along the sample 
values of the characteristics. However, while some of the characteristics, such as the 
experience accumulated within the firm or the general experience accumulated during the 
individual’s working history, are measured continuously, others are represented as 
categorical or dummy variables (like the level of education or the type of contract). When 
the characteristics are continuous, we first calculate the level of discrimination for each 
female, as the difference between reference and estimated earnings, and then condition the 
distribution of that density function on the marginal distribution of the considered 
characteristic (see Paragraph 2). Then we represent the conditional density function with 
respect to the values of the characteristic. In this case the absence of wage discrimination 
is represented by a concentration of the probability mass along the parallel to the 
horizontal axis. In the case of categorical variables, we can not calculate the conditional 
density function of the wage gap relative to the distribution of the characteristic. Then, we 
focus on the density function of the counterfactual wage conditional on the estimated wage 
and we represent in separate graphs these conditional density functions for any level of the 
characteristic of interest.  
In Figure 2 we represent the conditional density functions of discrimination with respect 
to the years of experience accumulated in the labour market prior to the present 
occupation. Part a) of the graph is relative to 1990 and part b) is for 1997. A first general 
feature common to both years is that most of the probability mass is concentrated on 
discriminatory values against female workers. However, some interesting differences 
between the two years are evident. In 1990, discrimination even had negative values, in 
particular with respect to very low or very high levels of experience. In 1997, a very small 
part of the distribution is concentrated on negative values and in areas indicating low 
levels of discrimination; moreover, the level of negative discrimination noticeably reduced 
between the two years. The two distributions present a significant difference; while the 
mass of discrimination is essentially parallel to the horizontal axis in 1990, it presents an 
increasing trend in 1997, meaning that in 1997 we observe individual discrimination 
against workers with higher levels of experience. The higher is the accumulation of human 
capital, the higher is the dimension of discrimination. Essentially, our results show that 
throughout the period considered discrimination increased for individuals with more 
experience.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
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Rather similar results emerge from the analysis of the relation between discrimination 
and experience accumulated within the firm - what we have called tenure. As was the case 
with experience, the position and the shape of the probability mass suggest the presence of 
significant wage discrimination against female workers in both years with an increase in 
the discrimination over the period. In particular, between 1990 and 1997 a woman’s 
probability of being favoured (or ‘negatively discriminated’ against) and the level of such 
discrimination were noticeably reduced. In addition in 1997 female workers with higher 
levels of tenure are characterised by a higher probability of being discriminated against; 
the highest contour plots in figure 3b clearly present an upwards trend. This analysis also 
confirms the results with respect to general experience; throughout the first seven years of 
the 1990s the discriminatory phenomenon was characterised by an increasing 
diversification between individuals. The degree of discrimination was increasingly uneven 
in its distribution between individuals an presented a positive correlation with levels of 
experience and tenure. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the relation between education and discrimination for 1990 and 
1997 respectively. As explained in Section 2, the variable education is a categorical 
variable so we are not able to represent discrimination with respect to the different values 
of education. Instead we are forced to plot the density function of the reference earnings 
conditional on estimated earnings, for any level of education. We split the sample between 
workers with a level lower than upper-secondary education and those with either an upper-
secondary education or a university degree. In contrast to the results we previously 
observed for other human capital characteristics, we find that higher educational levels 
yield lower discrimination.  
 
[Figures 4 and 5 around here] 
 
Actually, the situation is slightly different between the two years. In 1990 the density 
mass for high educated individuals is partially located under the diagonal, meaning that 
workers with higher educational levels can be affected by negative discrimination. On the 
contrary, workers with low educational levels are almost exclusively affected by positive 
discrimination. Then, the higher the educational level the higher the probability of being 
favourably discriminated at any wage level. In 1997 workers with a higher level of 
education were also discriminated against less, but this advantage noticeably narrowed 
compared to 1990. In this year the dimension of discrimination appears almost equally 
distributed independently of the educational level. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we have analysed and compared the extent of discrimination between 1990 
and 1997 in two Italian North-Eastern provinces.  
We have proposed a new method that evaluates discrimination by focussing directly on 
the distributions of estimated and reference earnings making use of stochastic kernels to 
describe their relationship; this method makes it possible to detect both group and  16
individual components of the unexplained wage gap, and to assign a probability of 
occurrence to any level of discrimination.  
The distributional analysis has been focused in particular on the relationship between 
human capital characteristics and discrimination. With respect to general experience and 
tenure, the density function representation suggests the presence of significant wage 
discrimination against female workers in both years with an increase in the phenomenon 
over the period. In 1997 female workers with higher levels of both experience and tenure 
were characterised by a higher probability of being discriminated against, compared to 
1990. Moreover, a woman’s probability of being negatively discriminated and the level of 
such discrimination were noticeably reduced in 1997. 
In contrast to the results on the relationship between experience, tenure and 
discrimination, we found that higher educational levels are associated with lower 
discrimination. The situation was slightly different between the two years. In 1990 workers 
with higher educational levels were affected by both positive and negative discrimination, 
while workers with low educational levels were almost exclusively affected by positive 
discrimination. In 1997 workers with a higher level of education were also subject to less 
discrimination, but this advantage had noticeably narrowed compared to 1990. In 1997 the 
dimension of discrimination appears almost equally distributed independently of the 
educational level. 
Summing up, the comparison between 1990 and 1997 shows an increasingly unequal 
incidence of discrimination along the characteristics of women. In particular 
discrimination is correlated negatively with education and positively with levels of general 
and specific human capital. These results confirm the value of studying the distribution of 
discrimination as suggested here rather than representing it in the traditional way that 
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Note: Earnings are expressed in thousands lire (constant prices, base 1995). 
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Figure 4. Probability density functions of counterfactual earnings conditional on estimated earnings, by 
educational level. Year 1990. 
 
Education level lower than upper-secondary 






























































Upper-secondary or university educational level 
































































Figure 5. Probability density functions of counterfactual earnings conditional on estimated earnings, by 
educational level. Year 1997. 
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Sample average for each variable 
     1990        1997   
   Women  Men    Women  Men 
 
Primary education    .690    .709    .518  .591 
Secondary education    .295    .269    .453  .363 
University education     .013    .021    .027  .044 
Education   1.323    1.311    1.509  1.452 
Tenure   .217    .209    .231  .219 
Experience   .091    .107    .109  .114 
White-collar   .329    .173    .419  .194 
Full-time   .979    .998    .968  .997 
CFL   .164    .160    .069  .073 
Apprenticeship   .135    .115    .078  .059 
Sector 3 (Metals, precision tools)  .161    .439    .236  .478 
Sector 4 (Food, clothing, wood)  .614    .374    .503  .347 
Sector 6 (Commerce)    .150    .158    .166  .143 
Sector 8 (Credit)    .074    .026    .094  .030 
Firm size 1_5    .271    .236    .237  .191 
Firm size 6_10    .170    .138    .129  .123 
Firm size 11_20    .229    .164    .205  .161 
Firm size 21_50    .127    .164    .159  .184 
Firm size 51_100    .071    .101    .101  .132 














Table A2          
Daily earnings (1000 lire) and wage gap by quartiles and occupation*     
 
   1990    1997 
  Women Men  Wage  gap    Women Men  Wage  gap 
Mean    77.24 89.43 13.63   82.3 95.73  14.03 
S.D:    16.74 23.72     19.31 24.2   
10%    58.85 66.79 11.89   65.03 73.13 11.08 
25%    70.51 76.65 8.01    72.19 81.12 11.01 
Median    75.66 86.25 12.28   80.21 91.7  12.53 
75%    83.51 98.57 15.28   90.11 105.64  14.70 
90%    94.19 115.49  18.44   102.7 124  17.18 
White-collar 
Mean    88.98 109.9 19.04   94.12 112.57  16.39 
S.D.    19.08 33.28     19.84 30.99  
10%    72.04 78.09 7.75    75.78 81.68 7.22 
25%    77.17 86.2  10.48   81.6  89.89 9.22 
Median    84.34 101.76  17.12   89.34 104.69  14.66 
75%    95.53 126.51  24.49   100.8 128.35  21.46 
90%    111.63 151.86 26.49    118.26 153.69 23.05 
Blue-collar 
Mean    71.84 85.16 15.64   74.43 91.73 18.86 
S.D.    12.22 18.54     14.29 20.33  
10%    54.52 62.65 12.98   56.98 71.84 20.68 
25%    68.22 75.34 9.45    69.02 79.48 13.16 
Median    73.11 84.44 13.42   74.74 89.54 16.53 
75%    78.46 94.93 17.35   82.42 101.7 18.96 
90%    84.86 106.41  20.25   89.93 115.46  22.11 
* Only year-round workers. Wage gap in percentage         
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Table A3  
a) Earnings functions. Dependent variable logW*. Year 1990     
   W o m e n      M e n     
   Coefficient  S.E.   Coefficient  S.E. 
 
Constant    3.1499   0129   3.2574   .1301 
Education    .2310   .0916   .1466   .0748 
Experience**    .7069   .1861   .7224   .1766 
Experience2   -.7351   .1682   -.6987   .1830 
Tenure**    1.1431   .1659   .8992   .1093 
Tenure2    -1.0173   .0919   -.7503   .0466 
White-collar      .0928   .0335   .1164   .0365 
Full-time    .6126   .0109   .7750   .0398 
CFL    -.0217   .0036   -.0751   .0068 
Apprenticeship   -.0943   .0378   -.2598   .0397 
Sector  3    .0088   .0056   .0529   .0019 
Sector 4 (base category) 
Sector  6    .0295   .0053   .0207   .0029 
Sector  8    -.0530   .0092   .1057   .0118 
Firm-size  1-5   -.0346   .0030   -.0658   .0035 
Firm-size  6-10   -.0114   .0028   -.0196   .0034 
Firm-size 11-20 (base category) 
Firm-size  21-50    .0288   .0039   .0220   .0035 
Firm-size  51-100    .0428   .0061   .0348   .0046 
Firm-size  101+   .0875   .0073   .0627   .0073 
 
Observations   33862      Observations  37195 
R2    0.4108      R2   0.5395 
 
Table A3 
b) Earnings functions. Dependent variable logW*. Year 1997     
   W o m e n      M e n  
   C o e f f i c i e n t   S . E .    Coefficient S.E.       
 
Constant    3.2745   .1203   3.3320   .0924 
Education    .1237   .0641   .0930   .0454 
Experience**    .4858   .1411   .6473   .1151 
Experience 2   -.4863   .1168   -.4653   .1076 
Tenure**    .9356   .1109   .8988   .0855 
Tenure2    -.7922   .0524   -.6247   .0487 
White-collar      .1582   .0269   .1324   .0217 
Full-time    .6353   .0092   .7809   .0306 
CFL    -.0136   .0053   -.0663   .0041 
Apprenticeship   -.0951   .0248   -.2236   .0256 
Sector  3    .0398   .0028   .0690   .0022 
Sector 4 (base category) 
Sector  6    .0501   .0039   .0348   .0033 
Sector  8    .0419   .0071   .1369   .0093 
Firm-size  1-5   -.0508   .0038   -.0763   .0036 
Firm-size  6-10   -.0173   .0035   -.0191   .0039 
Firm-size 11-20 (base category) 
Firm-size  21-50    .0450   .0039   .0291   .0034 
Firm-size  51-100    .0623   .0050   .0272   .0042 
Firm-size  >  101    .1053   .0073   .0591   .0058 
 
Observations   30447      Observations  34313 
R2    0.4563      R2   0.4249 
* Estimates corrected by the White var-cov matrix. 
** ‘Tenure’ and’ experience’ are scaled by 1000 
 